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At Kamukunji public grounds in the Kibera slum in south-western Nairobi, a man walked up to me and introduced himself as George. It was noon on a December day in 
2010 and the grounds were filled with people. George took out 
his mobile phone and showed it to me. !is was no surprise; after 
spending a few days in the slum, I had met people who told me they 
lived on the street but owned or used mobile phones. He explained 
how the phone was vital to his livelihood and that of his family. 
I asked him what he thought about the many non-governmental 
organization (NGO) events taking place in the slum, a question 
to which he responded “most people in Kibera do not trust barazas 
[public meetings] because they think someone has been paid to do 
it. With this”—he held up his phone—“we ourselves [sic] can do 
the things.”1
!e next week, I met with the Kenyan Permanent Secre-
tary of Information and Communication, Dr. Bitange Ndemo, 
and asked him about the government’s vision for Kenya. Ndemo 
responded that he wants every Kenyan to have access to informa-
tion and communication technologies (ICT): “For every 10 percent 
[of growth in ICT access], you grow the economy by 1.5 percent 
[of ] GDP.” In this way, he explained, Kenya would develop as an 
ICT hub for East Africa, which would strengthen and improve the 
Kenyan state. Achieving this goal required the participation of all 
Kenyans and a change in the national work ethic toward “a Version 
2.0 of our culture,” he stated, adding that this required integration 
and discipline.2
!ese stories show two very different perspectives on what 
mobile phone technology means for Kenya and Kenyans. For 
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George, it creates business opportunities and gives him autonomy 
in everyday life. He does not trust the authorities nor does he be-
lieve that they can help him. For Ndemo, ICT fosters economic 
development and integrates Kenyans into a political community. 
It is a tool for ensuring the future of Kenyan state development. 
While both point to the development potential of ICT, the conflict 
between the goals of autonomy and integration, between slum and 
government office, suggests the need to reappraise our understand-
ing of the influence of technology on state-society relations in de-
velopment contexts.
Mobile communication technology potentially lowers barri-
ers to participation in public life, increases the intensity and range 
of communication, and alters the link between citizen and govern-
ment, creating alternative and disseminated forms of governance, 
such as local security and private service delivery. Yet this same 
potential provokes questions about the role of ICT. What forms 
of participation emerge, who is participating, and for what pur-
pose? What is the significance of slum inhabitants providing their 
own services? For what political purpose, if any, are mobile phones 
used? "is study uses these questions to interrogate the Kenyan 
state building project, the role of NGOs, and the informal political 
dynamics of urban slums. Its central concern is how mobile phones 
influence governance networks and participatory politics in Kibera.
Existing literature on the impact of mobile phones is of lim-
ited use as it tends to build on normative assumptions and focus 
on particular outcomes, despite an ongoing debate between opti-
mistic and skeptical views on the effects of ICT. "is paper takes 
a different approach in looking at the politics behind the use of 
mobile phones, specifically examining how development discourse 
and Kenya’s history have shaped the ways that agents of governance 
engage with Kibera. Based on field research conducted in Decem-
ber 2010 examining mobile phone use and the politics of slum gov-
ernance, the paper makes two connected assertions regarding the 
role of ICT in the relationship between Kibera, NGOs, and the 
Kenyan state. 
First, mobile phone technology amplifies social interactions 
220 +VEIWLSPQ1EOMRK7PYQW+SZIVREFPI
in reach and speed, making existing social networks more visible 
and intense. Providing its own services and security using mobile 
phones, the urban slum community of Kibera creates ad hoc gov-
ernance structures outside formal networks, resulting in a stronger 
community but also marginalizing community members from the 
context of state-facilitated socio-political life. With service and se-
curity delivery important public goods provided by the state, infor-
mal slum governance reduces citizen-state contact and results in 
marginalization, as local alternatives to formal governance emerge 
and service delivery in inaccessible slum areas fails. 
Secondly, independent service delivery and security provision 
pose challenges to the development and democratic consolidation 
of the Kenyan state, which suffers from corruption and political 
apathy. Together, state institutions and NGOs form a formal gov-
ernance network with overlapping yet occasionally conflicting 
agendas. Agents of the formal network operate based on estab-
lished administrative rules that exist within the official rule of law.3 
Regarding the use of ICT, both sets of actors seek greater partici-
pation and improved service delivery to legitimize their authority 
through input and output legitimacy, respectively,4 and to integrate 
Kibera residents into political processes by intervening in the slum. 
#ey see Kibera as a complex space that needs to be molded ac-
cording to a particular logic in order to be governable. Governability 
involves standardization and rationalization of social and natural 
reality “into a legible and administratively more convenient format,” 
which results in a particular construction of meaning and an ad-
ministrative understanding of the world that permeates the gov-
ernance network.5 Legibility refers to the ability of an authority to 
obtain and construct crucial information about subjects’ social and 
natural environment in order to exercise power. #e space of the 
slum must become legible, and new ICT provides the tools with 
which to do so. By providing their own services and security, and 
by challenging integration attempts on the part of the state, Kibera 
residents resist being made legible and governable; simultaneously, 
formal authorities have political incentives to act against this pro-
cess and use ICT to assert control. #us, new technologies enable 
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both integration efforts and the process of marginalization.
"is study first reviews existing literature on the impact of 
mobile phones on governance and participation, highlighting limi-
tations of the current literature. It then details the methodology 
used in field research. "e recent political history of Kenya, and 
ICT developments, are explored, and the Kibera slum is introduced 
in greater detail. "e study then discusses the dynamics of mobile 
phone usage in Kibera in relation to policies and projects of the for-
mal governance network and introduces arguments by James Scott 
concerning state optics and state-society relations, which provide 
valuable tools in understanding ICT usage in Kibera. Finally, the 
paper presents implications for the formal governance network 
resulting from the politics of ICT adoption in marginalized com-
munities. 
TOWARD A NON-NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF ICT
ICT includes electronic hardware and software that facili-
tate the production, distribution, and consumption of information 
through networked communication. Research for this paper was 
focused on mobile phone technology and how it interacts with and 
complements radio and Internet communication. Mobile technol-
ogy is a relatively understudied area compared to the Internet;6 
moreover, an examination of multiple technologies creates an op-
portunity to understand how new platforms interact with old ones, 
as illustrated by the phenomenon of radio waves broadcasting over 
mobile phones, and thereby contextualize new technologies.7
New ICT, such as mobile phones, contribute to the communi-
cative space of the “networked public sphere.”8 "is common space 
is an information environment characterized by near elimination of 
communication costs and by the potential for many-to-many com-
munications, rather than the one-to-one (interpersonal) or one-
to-many (mass) communications which characterize “traditional” 
media like television or radio.9 In a networked society, interactions 
are among diverse demographics and social connections switch be-
tween multiple networks, as boundaries become more permeable 
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and hierarchies become flatter and more complex.10 Network soci-
ety today “cannot be understood or represented without its techno-
logical tools.” Indeed, technology augments and amplifies processes 
of change taking place within societies.11 Omnipresent ICT has 
become a defining feature of modern society.
!e following section provides an overview of the literature 
on the influence of new ICT, particularly mobile phones, on gover-
nance and participation as political goals, introducing a theoretical 
framework and methodology to address some of the limitations 
of this body of work. !e argument that ICT has an impact upon 
politics is not new;12 yet the precise nature of the effects is con-
tested.13 Research on new ICT in Africa remains limited and has 
only recently addressed development.14 Nevertheless, literature on 
mobile phones, political participation, and governance is growing, 
with several clear positions emerging in the debate.
Debates in the ICT Literature
An optimistic position, embodied in the term ICT for de-
velopment—ICT4D— tends to view new ICT as a solution that 
enables economies and politics to leapfrog into new forms.15 !is 
position involves the view that ICT enables people to transform 
their lives by lowering barriers to information and increasing com-
munication access, as well as offering integration into the demo-
cratic, participatory sphere by lowering barriers to entry in delib-
eration.16 ICT allows for participation in public processes and 
adds new dimensions to the local and global public sphere.17 Erik 
Bucy and Kimberly Gregson view widespread political participa-
tion as legitimizing authority and functioning as an instrument of 
consent.18 For these authors, a corollary benefit of this interactivity 
is efficient service delivery and accountable governance. When citi-
zens have easier access to information concerning their government 
and faster ways to communicate, the pressure on government and 
public institutions to fulfill their obligations increases. !is fosters 
transparency, reporting, awareness, and deterrence.19 Increased 
visibility has an impact on decision-making and service delivery, 
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which benefits service recipients.20 Supporters of this stance argue 
that mobile phones have the potential to promote deliberative par-
ticipation and good governance, and can be used in development 
contexts for that purpose.
!ese “optimist” arguments have shaped development prac-
tice through ICT4D.21 !e 2002 World Bank ICT strategy paper 
suggests that mobile phones empower and improve the well-being 
of poor people while enhancing the efficiency and transparency of 
the public sector.22 Similarly, the 2011 World Bank approach paper 
advocates the use of this “unprecedented development opportuni-
ty” to help countries leapfrog toward better service delivery.23 !is 
approach tends to examine particular outcomes of new ICT use 
that may enhance democratic participation and good governance. 
However, it appears to build on a functionalist understanding of 
mobile phones as a tool of social change and contains an element of 
technological determinism, focusing on the inevitability of transi-
tion toward particular development goals such as service delivery 
and transparency, which seems removed from political realities.
In response to the arguments outlined above, some authors 
take a skeptical position, arguing that power relations do not nec-
essarily change with technology and that issues of access, control, 
and power are unchanged.24 Pippa Norris asserts that new ICT 
reinforces existing patterns of social stratification, creating a “digital 
divide” between those with access and ICT-literacy, the “informa-
tion-rich,” and the “information poor,” who do not have these at-
tributes.25 M.F. Rice contends that ICT growth has implications 
for global inequality as well as rural/urban and rich/poor divides 
within countries,26 as infrastructure and access are centrally con-
trolled.27 A second line of argument focuses on the ways in which 
ICT may be used for control and surveillance. !ese studies have 
tended to focus on repressive regimes and how government author-
ities use ICT to monitor and control their populations, through, 
for instance, mobile phone tracking and monitoring.28 Mobile 
phones can be an obstacle to deliberation and a tool for repres-
sive governance. Moreover, mobile phones have the potential to be 
abused on the ground. Because ICT tends to be more decentralized 
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than radio or television, it is also less centrally regulated than tradi-
tional media, enabling harmful messages to spread quickly in times 
of crisis. An example of this darker side of ICT is when mobile 
phones were used to promote hate speech and mob violence in the 
wake of the Kenyan election of 2007–08, as raised by Joshua Gold-
stein and Juliana Rotich.29 !e skeptic’s position on ICT therefore 
questions if and how mobile phones produce outcomes that im-
prove democratic participation and good governance.
Developing a Non-Normative Research Framework
Much previous literature focuses on the potential outcomes 
of ICT and thus seeks to provide policy advice for using ICT in 
furthering development goals, assuming a positive causal relation-
ship between ICT and development. Other authors emphasize the 
problems of power inequalities that underpin ICT use. Yet even 
the proponents of the skeptical position appear to focus on the bar-
riers to these goals, while not questioning the goals themselves. All 
place an implicit value on social change, democratic practices, and 
development, and tend to fall within a development discourse that 
posits a deterministic view of transition as leading from "under-
development" toward "something better." !is literature, and the 
ICT4D agenda, evaluate what ICT should do and assess technol-
ogy accordingly.30
!e normative discourse around ICT merges with develop-
ment practice and, as discussed in the following section, has been 
adopted by the Kenyan government.31 However, some authors call 
for a less value-laden approach to understanding the political inter-
ests involved.32 When exploring the politics behind change, tak-
ing a normative standpoint from the outset can blur and obscure 
underlying power relations. !e question is who defines what the 
outcome should be, and why. Technology permeates and defines 
society; the two cannot be separated.33 !is paper focuses on what 
ICT does and how it is used for political purposes. As such, it is 
necessary to adopt a different framework.
Isolating the social characteristics of mobile phones with-
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out presupposing socio-political outcomes may show how ICT 
impacts social relations, thus providing a useful framework with 
which to conceptualize the Kibera case. Collective action and net-
work society theory suggest mobile phones integrate existing social 
networks.
Mobile phone access reduces barriers to collective action 
and social groups.34 Mobile phones decentralize the production, 
consumption, and distribution of information, while the spatio-
temporal immediacy of communication it allows enables greater 
ease of participation in the public sphere. It does not necessarily 
follow that participation levels increase: only that such potential 
exists.35 Mobile phones also allow for micro-contributions to col-
lective action across structural barriers, as every participant can 
function as a producer, distributor, and consumer of information. 
Aggregated contributions build up in size and intensity of inter-
action, making the value of the social network to each individual 
increase exponentially.36 Furthermore, mobile phones contribute 
to reproducing a social network through greater connectivity. !ey 
allow for a decentralized and non-hierarchical organization of so-
cial networks,37 which enables the formation of spontaneous com-
munities and action.38 !e ease of decentralized group formation 
amplifies existing social structures and behavior. !e Kibera case 
presents us with an opportunity to test how these hypotheses fare 
in the field. 
METHODOLOGY AND FIELD RESEARCH
!e field research for this study sought to explore how mo-
bile phones were used in Kibera and how key stakeholders in the 
ICT field viewed its political potential. Research methods included 
semi-structured interviews with government officials, NGO man-
agers, and Kibera residents, as well as ethnographic observations 
on information culture and communication flows in Kibera. Semi-
structured interviews allow for in-depth exploration of issues im-
portant to respondents. !e interviews on the ground in Kibera 
were set up with the assistance of a local radio station, PamojaFM. 
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Interview subjects representative of different age, employment, and 
tribal groups were selected. Interviews were transcribed by hand. 
As an information hub for the slum community, PamojaFM also 
aided in observations at community focal points where people meet 
to exchange information, such as cafés or community centers. "e 
interviews with managers and officials were audio-recorded, with 
interview subjects selected on the basis of their influence in the 
field of ICT. "ese subjects included the Permanent Secretary of 
Information and Communication, officials of the Communications 
Commission of Kenya (CCK), and leaders of NGOs operating in 
Kibera.
All interview subjects were allowed to shape the conversation 
and draw on their own experiences, providing a picture of the dis-
course surrounding ICT and motivations behind decision-making 
from the perspectives of a variety of actors.39 "is method also 
moved away from a focus on the transformative capacity of ICT 
by avoiding predetermined hypotheses. Instead, field research 
sought to understand how ICT is used in political contexts and 
how it is used to realize particular goals. "is openness resulted 
in rich, albeit disparate, material that points in many directions. 
While officials focused their responses on issues like improving ac-
cess to services, public sector efficiency, and citizen participation, 
ICT users in Kibera emphasized the autonomy from authority and 
greater ease of everyday social interaction afforded by ICT. "ey 
also noted many Kibera residents depended economically on this 
new technology. A discrepancy has emerged between the complex-
ity and richness of public and political life in Kibera and the admin-
istrative simplicity with which both state institutions and NGOs 
approach the same reality.
"is theoretical and methodological framework provides a 
way to look at the intersection of mobile phone technology, par-
ticipation, and governance in a Nairobi slum. It is impossible to 
understand the politics of ICT in Kibera without first getting a 
grasp of the existing political landscape and the history that has 
shaped and maintained it.
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Integratory Processes, Political Space: Contextualizing Political 
Agendas in Kibera 
Kenya’s history of political corruption has led to calls for 
state consolidation from within, a policy that would involve the 
state pursuing governance reform and participatory policies while 
adopting a development discourse.40 Recent developments in ICT 
have presented new opportunities for this agenda to be realized. 
!e Kenya African National Union (KANU) party, led by Dan-
iel arap Moi, embraced corruption and political repression in its 
four decades in power, keeping the opposition divided to maintain 
power. In a country with forty-two ethnic groups, elections became 
ethno-regional censuses,41 making mobilization by ethnicity a po-
tent political strategy.42 In 2002, KANU was defeated.43 Mwai 
Kibaki’s National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) won the election 
on a platform of dialogue, anti-corruption initiatives, and power 
sharing.44 !is change in regime resulted in high expectations for 
accountable governance and democratic participation. However, 
Kibaki abandoned these commitments, marginalizing coalition 
members and joining with KANU to consolidate power. Ethno-
regional politics became the mode of governance once again45 and 
anti-corruption efforts fell apart, resulting in widespread political 
disillusionment with the Kibaki regime.46
More recent Kenyan political history builds on a political 
culture prone to ethno-regional competition and corrupt institu-
tions.47 After a contested general election in 2007, Kibaki was 
sworn in for a second term despite opposition from the Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM). Violence erupted across Kenya 
and morphed into aggression between ethnic groups, leaving over 
one thousand dead and six hundred thousand displaced.48 !is 
heightened social climate further raised demands for accountable 
governance and peaceful participation.
Introducing competitive elections before reforming gover-
nance institutions,49 as well as the lack of conviction in imple-
menting these reforms,50 may have contributed to Kenya’s political 
instability. Regardless, the current Kibaki government’s agenda is 
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shaped by aims like democratization and  “good governance” and 
“participation” that are widespread in global development dis-
course.51 “Good governance” entails accountability, sound public 
sector management, and transparency.52 However, this notion of 
rule reduces governance to technocratic efficacy and measurable 
outcomes; it cannot help in assessing how a governance network 
makes sense of the outside world. In contrast, this paper explores 
how the construction of meaning permeates a governance network 
and the ways in which administrative logic shapes how formal gov-
ernance agents describe the world, as well as how the public good 
is defined and pursued.53 In development discourse, “participa-
tion”  aims to recognize and enhance local and individual realities, 
becoming key to development practice.54 Integrating communi-
ties creates a political environment where the decisions taken are 
made with the consent of the governed. Participation is regarded 
as evidence of a functioning pluralist democracy, and, as such, has 
become a central goal for both NGOs and the state in Kibera.55 
However, participatory initiatives are often criticized as an external 
top-down process imposed on communities to legitimize an orga-
nization or project. Participation becomes a means to an end rather 
than an end in itself.56 "is paper approaches participation as a 
legitimizing project and integrative instrument used by political ac-
tors. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the Kenyan progres-
sive political elite do push for the consolidation of  Kenyan democ-
racy with the understanding that this can only occur by integrating 
Kenyans in political processes and pursuing good governance.57
With new ICT, the potential to fulfill this goal has increased. 
"e ICT4D agenda has thus merged with the agenda for good 
governance and participatory democracy adopted by the Kenyan 
government.58 Indeed, the official vision is for ICT to “facilitate 
sustained economic growth and poverty reduction; promote social 
justice and equity; mainstream gender in national development; 
empower youth and the disadvantaged groups; stimulate invest-
ment and innovation in ICT; and achieve universal access.”59
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ICT Hope
Such hope is not without cause, for the Kenyan ICT sector 
has greatly expanded over the past decade. As the political climate 
became more relaxed after 2002, the ICT sector was liberalized 
by the government, partly through privatization.60 As prices fell, 
mobile phone use surged. In 2005 there were 5.3 million mobile 
phone subscribers in Kenya.61 By September 2010, that number 
had grown to twenty-two million subscribers. !is gives Kenya a 
mobile tele-density of 55.9 percent,62 well above the African aver-
age.
In addition to an increase in the sheer number of mobile 
phone users in Kenya, successful mobile phone applications and 
businesses have emerged. !e Safaricom company M-PESA (short 
for mobile pesa, the Kiswahili word for money), launched in 2007, 
has introduced a mobile phone application that enables on-the-go 
financial management, thereby contributing to financial security. In 
2009, a daily average of $1.96 million were transferred; by January 
2011, thirteen million customers were using the service.63 Another 
example of innovation in the ICT sector is Ushahidi, a company 
that uses crowdsourcing technology to gather information through 
short messaging service (SMS) reports. !is information is subse-
quently categorized and mapped online in real time. !e platform 
was developed during the 2007–08 post-election period to file re-
ports on violence and police action and has since been used world-
wide.64 Both services are extensively utilized in the Kibera slum.
Once adopted, these technologies fit into existing social prac-
tices. In Kenya, radio is the primary source of information for the 
public with an 87 percent penetration rate, a number now matched 
by urban mobile phone use.65 Next to radio, word of mouth is the 
most frequent mode of receiving information.66 Information dis-
seminated through opinion leaders, information hubs, and person-
al networks tends to be highly trusted.67 Weekly access to mobile 
phones is at 94 percent in urban areas and 83 percent in rural areas. 
Youth, men, and the highly educated are the most frequent users of 
mobile phone technology, but even in groups with limited access, at 
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least half are regular users. !e most common use of mobile phone 
technology is sending and receiving SMS messages, primarily for 
everyday social purposes, but also for managing finances through 
M-PESA or contacting larger community groups.68 !us, the po-
tential for harnessing ICT to development goals has increased with 
the growth of the sector. !e Kibera community stands to benefit 
greatly from this growth.
The Challenge of Slums
When trying to realize the goals of participatory politics and 
good governance, urban slums such as Kibera present a particular 
challenge. A slum may be defined as “a residential area which has 
developed without legal claims to the land . . . [and] as a result of 
their illegal or semi-legal status, infrastructure and services are usu-
ally inadequate.”69 Kibera covers a large area southwest of down-
town Nairobi. It is densely populated, composed mainly of unreg-
istered, often homemade shelters with poor access to sanitation 
and water facilities.70 !e majority of the slum’s housing is owned 
by local landlords, who rent out their property to slum residents.71 
Data on mobile phone use in Kibera have shown a high 
monthly migration flux, as almost 50 percent of inhabitants are 
moving elsewhere or to other parts of the slum.72 !e 2009 offi-
cial census showed 170,070 slum residents, yet the United Nations 
Human Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT) estimated a total 
population of six hundred thousand to one million inhabitants in 
2007.73 Because of these estimates, Kibera has received more at-
tention than other slums such as Mathare and Korogocho.74 Such 
fluctuations in migration point to the difficulty of obtaining reli-
able data about the slum, data necessary to provide a basis for a 
governance plan.
!is dynamic reality is no obstacle for the spread of technol-
ogy, with mobile communication rising sharply in Kibera. Like in 
other urban areas, there is relatively easy access to mobile phones 
and the Internet in Kibera, as well as newspapers, television, and 
radio. Radio and mobile phones are the preferred modes of com-
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munication, partly because of their lower costs and partly because 
they merge well into existing social practices while avoiding the 
structural problems posed by other media. Newspapers, television, 
and Internet surfing are too expensive for many Kibera residents, 
and must therefore be accessed in central community hubs. In con-
trast, every resident I met in Kibera either owned a mobile phone or 
had access to one. A homeless person explained how he occasion-
ally prioritizes mobile communication above shelter and food.75 
Residents cited word of mouth channels as their primary or most 
trusted source of information. While external sources are trusted 
less, the local community radio PamojaFM is highly valued.76
Kibera has found itself embroiled within Kenya’s national po-
litical struggles, with Prime Minister Raila Odinga of the ODM 
the current Member of Parliament (MP) for the area. After the 
2007-08 disputed election, violence and plunder spread quickly 
throughout the slum, with ethno-political support bases as the 
main targets. A result of these patterns of violence is more distinct 
spatial separation of ethnic groups in Kibera than before the elec-
tion.77 !e director of a women’s center in the slum told of neigh-
bors turning against each other during the post-election violence.78 
!is  recent conflict has added to outsiders’ perception of the slum 
as a chaotic social space that must be ordered to improve the lives 
of slum residents. As the slum is often inaccessible to state institu-
tions, NGOs play an important role in working toward this goal.
Since the 1980s, NGOs have proliferated in Kenya.79 Al-
though the exact number is uncertain, an estimated six thousand 
to fifteen thousand NGOs work in Kibera alone.80 A mixture of 
local and foreign organizations, NGOs in Kibera have different 
budgets, goals, and modes of operation. According to a local as-
sistant chief, not all NGOs fulfill their purposes, yet penetration 
and visibility are high.81 During the course of my fieldwork, an 
average of three events were held daily by various NGOs. Despite 
this, there is a common perception within the community that lo-
cals in attendance are paid to participate and NGO projects are ex-
ternally directed.82 Still, NGOs are particularly necessary in slum 
areas as they increasingly represent a means to delegate develop-
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ment work.83 Vital to service delivery in Kibera, NGOs still face 
problems similar to those in the way of efforts to instate legitimate 
governance structures in Kibera.
Besides NGOs, Kibera has a governance structure that com-
bines traditional and state institutions. "e slum is divided into 
thirteen villages. District officers and village chief officials appoint-
ed by the state deal with local disputes and everyday administra-
tion, in collaboration with village elders and councils. Village elders 
traditionally hold authority over specific ethnic groups and deal 
with community issues when called upon by residents or chiefs.84 
However, interview subjects in Kibera expressed distrust not only 
of the appointed officials, but also of the elders, who are seen as 
a tribal anachronism, particularly by young people.85 Still, formal 
governance networks are frequently used when the need arises. In 
sum, Kibera has a dense web of institutions and actors, with mul-
tiple agents claiming authority within the space of the slum.
Having explored the political context of ICT in Kenya and 
how key actors have adopted the merging ICT and development 
agenda to improve the history of governance, this study now turns 
to two questions concerning the application of ICT. It examines 
both how ICT is used to pursue the above actors’ goals and how 
Kibera—a space that presents a challenge to governance and one 
that is nonetheless deeply embedded in governance networks—
contests these goals through informal governance facilitated by 
mobile phone use.
Informal Governance
Using mobile phones, the Kibera community is able to tackle 
issues of security and provide services that might otherwise be con-
sidered formal governance obligations through informal networks. 
Water shortages, fires, public violence, sanitation problems, and 
theft in the slum are frequently handled or contained by residents 
before police or other authorities reach the affected area, if they re-
spond at all.86 Easy participation, the role of micro-contributions, 
and decentralized group formation enable this process. News 
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spreads through mobile phone networks and emergencies are dealt 
with by using mobile phones to contact  friends and relatives. For-
mal governance networks often do handle service and security is-
sues, but slum residents emphasized the importance of the informal 
networks and how they allowed for residents to support themselves 
without assistance from “outside.”87
Lacking information, the slum is difficult for outsiders to nav-
igate. For slum residents, on the other hand, information spreads 
quickly by word of mouth and through hubs such as the radio 
station and cafés that disseminate information.88 Mobile com-
munication increases the volume of communication and the spa-
tial distance it can bridge, thus extending informal practices. "e 
communication process has become significantly faster, enabling 
residents to deal with problems and provide for themselves with 
greater flexibility. What emerges are informal, ad hoc governance 
networks that, on a regular basis, effectively circumvent formal au-
thority to deal with pressing issues.
"ese informal practices are defined by the language of the 
agents operating within them. Agents of Kibera’s social network 
construct meaning in their world in a way that often seems incom-
prehnsible to those on the outside, allowing communication to flow 
more securely and freely. Common points of reference and the mix-
ture of tribal slang, English, and Kiswahili used create a localized 
understanding of the world.89 "is blend is also influenced by the 
language of development used in formal governance networks, par-
ticularly by NGOs, with words such as “empowerment” or “partici-
pation” strategically employed to obtain services rather than being 
integrated into everyday language. 
"e local radio station, PamojaFM, illustrates how this 
practice interacts with formal governance and existing ICT. As a 
community hub and center of information, PamojaFM dissemi-
nates information both within and outside of the slum. "ere is a 
palpable sense of community ownership of the station, and many 
slum residents participate in on-air debates and interactions.90 
For instance, on the night of my arrival to the station, a girl was 
raped in the slum. "e news spread through social networks and 
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reached PamojaFM over mobile phones. PamojaFM reporters then 
confirmed the story by calling people in the area and contacted a 
relevant NGO which assisted in caring for the victim. In the fol-
lowing days, debates were held about gender rights and women’s se-
curity in the slum, with support from several NGO campaigns.91 
In this way, mobile phone technology enhances the capacity of a 
local information and communication hub like PamojaFM to ad-
dress problems in the slum, thus also strengthening existing social 
networks.
Circumvention of formal governance is more than a practical 
issue. Interviewing young people on mobile phone use and political 
participation, I asked them how they would get information about 
their MP or about election campaigns. !e response was either 
laughter or denial of any interest in such questions. No one I inter-
viewed seemed concerned with political affairs and many expressed 
distrust of authority. Interest in the local community is far greater 
because residents exhibit both a greater sense of ownership and 
agency on decision-making in projects as well as greater participa-
tion in local events.92 Although not representative of the views of 
every Kibera resident, my interview subjects conveyed a sense of 
political apathy and passive resistance to authority. Given Kenya’s 
political history, this is not surprising.
Efforts at ICT Integration
When formal governance fails to deliver security and servic-
es, it seems the only solution for Kibera residents is to provide for 
themselves. However, from the point of view of formal governance 
institutions and civil society actors, using ICT to integrate mar-
ginalized and rural communities is essential to a vision of the de-
velopmental state’s future. !e state seeks to integrate people into 
the political process in order to improve public perceptions of its 
governance record. It seeks to do this by producing input legiti-
macy through increased citizen participation and state consolida-
tion by constructing and gathering administrative knowledge about 
its subjects, thus enhancing governance capacity, which in turn al-
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lows for the provision of services that result in output legitimacy.93 
Likewise, NGOs working within a liberal development agenda 
seek to demonstrate community participation in their projects in 
order to legitimate their work and ensure funding from donors.
Government ICT policies are implemented by the Kenya 
ICT board and the ministry for ICT. !ese policies are good ex-
amples of the way in which the state envisions Kenya and the need 
for integration. !e Digital Villages Project aims to provide broad-
band connections to remote areas in Kenya at a reasonable price. 
According to permanent secretary Ndemo, the project will boost 
the Kenyan economy, increase foreign investment in Kenya’s ICT 
capacity, and encourage Kenyans to participate in public debate.94 
!is policy may also be an attempt to integrate every Kenyan into 
a political community with common goals. Access is not unidirec-
tional, but rather connects Kenyans to a political community to 
ensure access to formal governance. 
Other policies are passive in nature. !e e-Government 
policy and digital records strategy aim to improve government ac-
countability and reduce corruption by making all records digital.95 
!e logic is that by putting everything online, important files can-
not "disappear" and services are publicly available, which in turn 
reduces incentives for corruption. !is process is underway but has 
met some resistance within parts of the government elite and bu-
reaucracy.96 Both these policies can be viewed as aiming to improve 
good governance and increase participation.
NGOs use ICT to ensure participation and improve gov-
ernance, both in regard to the state and their own organizations. 
An example is the Map Kibera project, which has trained Kibera 
residents to map the slum using GPS technology and to report on 
events through SMS messages that use the Ushahidi platform. !e 
data is then uploaded to online street maps or the Voices of Kibera 
blog.97 !is project, one of knowledge-building and dissemina-
tion, has been aimed primarily at improving the performance of 
formal governance initiatives in the slum and providing a map to 
better understand and navigate the slum. According to a former 
project mapper, “only people outside Kibera and Kenya use services 
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like Map Kibera. It is not useful for people here.”98
Another example of NGO use of ICT is Huduma, an on-
line platform that uses Ushahidi to improve accountability through 
citizen reporting on public service delivery.99 !is project was 
launched by the Social Development Network (SODNET) in Jan-
uary 2011 and targets service delivery and corruption by recording 
how much money government services receive and then asking peo-
ple to report on-the-ground results, which are then mapped online. 
Similarly, SODNET’s budget tracking tool provides constituency 
spending records online for citizens to access.100 !e projects are 
new and their effects remain to be seen. Yet the logic behind them is 
that citizen integration not only legitimizes formal governance but 
also improves good governance, as public sector transparency and 
NGO efficiency increases.
!ese projects and policies attempt to build the capacity of 
the Kenyan state and improve its legitimacy and accountability 
through participatory ICT tools. Yet it seems that such projects are 
aimed primarily at assisting or enhancing the formal governance 
network rather than toward the people these networks attempt to 
integrate. As such, these external participatory projects are trying 
to make Kenyans "governable" by integrating them into a political 
community. !e history of Kenyan politics, as well as the develop-
mental focus of "good governance" and democratic participation, 
has led the formal governance network to pursue this agenda. !is 
project is challenged, however, by the presence of informal gover-
nance networks in Kibera that are amplified by mobile phone use. 
In this way, ICT shapes the way governance and participatory poli-
tics are contested, resulting in simultaneous processes of integra-
tion and marginalization.
!ese analyses require caution. It is not simply the use of mo-
bile phones that challenges formal governance, but rather the way 
mobile phones amplify existing practices and power relations. In 
Kibera, informal networks emerge in, around, and outside formal 
networks, both complementing and clashing with them.101 Most 
mobile phone use can be classified as everyday social use. Yet it is 
because of these intensified social networks that informal gover-
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nance can take place at the depth and scale with which it operates 
in Kibera. Mobile phones make informal governance easier and 
more visible, as networks’ value increases exponentially as commu-
nicative activity increases.
Seeing Like a State
Several questions emerge once we step back for a moment and 
look broadly at the processes facilitated through ICT. How does 
formal governance deal with the challenge of a slum? Why is there 
such resistance to state and NGO authority? !ese questions are 
better addressed with conceptual tools theorized by James Scott. 
Scott’s arguments regarding state optics and ungoverned peoples 
help in understanding the political rationales behind integration 
processes, as well as why resistance emerges through informal net-
works.102
According to Scott, statecraft involves the standardization 
and rationalization of social and natural reality “into a legible and 
administratively more convenient format.”103 Social environments 
that require governing must first be molded and assimilated to the 
administrative logic of state bureaucracy. !is can be done through 
population surveys; standardization of weights, measures, and 
written language; and city planning.104 !e problem of legibility 
is intricately connected with the spatial distribution and reproduc-
tion of Kenyan state power, which in turn is partially determined 
by the state’s ability to create and sustain its legitimate authority.105 
Urban slums are difficult to work with in this context. !ey do not 
correspond to the lines on a city map, and navigating them requires 
local knowledge. Such information is rarely available to formal gov-
ernment authorities, and the social and physical complexity of the 
Kibera slum effectively renders its residents "invisible" to formal 
governance networks, which cannot analyze alternative forms of 
governance through a standardized technocratic lens.
While Kibera is deeply connected with the network practices 
of NGO and state governance, it is also, in a sense, invisible and 
situated “outside” of formal networks. Information on people living 
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there is difficult to gather, complex to understand, and thus prob-
lematic to act upon. Although exercised through local networks, 
the complexity of the social bonds, local language, and physical or-
ganization of the slum cannot be mapped onto the administrative 
grids used by formal authority. Consequently, the slum is perceived 
by both NGOs and the Kenyan state as messy and complex. When 
formal authority tries to operate within and read this space, any 
“designed or planned social order is necessarily schematic; it always 
ignores essential features of any real functioning social order.”106 
Making the slum legible requires tunnel vision that ignores the un-
wieldy reality by selecting one policy on which to focus energy and 
through which to exercise authority.107 
In light of Kenyan history, government and NGOs have fo-
cused on strategic positioning to improve the governance record 
and consolidate democracy, thereby legitimizing power. To pur-
sue this project, formal authority needs crucial information about 
its subjects, such as social maps and metrics of the slum terrain. 
Integrative and participatory ICT can assist with these goals and 
provide otherwise inaccessible information by providing means for 
citizens to report on and map their own social space. ICT becomes 
a tool in governing life and exercising authority according to a se-
lective vision in which submission to the formal grid creates legiti-
macy.
"e complexity of the social and natural environment also 
has to be shaped to an administrative logic. An example of how the 
realities of the slum are molded to fit this logic is when the Kenyan 
government, backed by the UN-HABITAT, initiated a re-hous-
ing program for residents of Nairobi slums in 2009.108 Although 
some slum residents moved to new homes, others chose to rent out 
these homes and move back to Kibera.109 Moreover, the Nubian 
community in Kibera objected to the re-housing program, claiming 
ownership of the land and arguing that the state’s focus should be 
on improving living conditions within Kibera.110 Residents view 
the slum as anything but chaotic and illegible, often actively resist-
ing attempts by external forces to shape their social space.
While undoubtedly motivated by a desire to improve the hu-
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man condition, the 2009 clearance program demonstrates the futil-
ity of efforts by formal authority to understand complex realities 
that are not adjusted to its own logic. Making Kibera’s complexity 
legible through mapping and clearing the slum is not an effort to 
depict reality but rather an attempt to present what is interesting 
to the outside observer. Backed by the power behind state and/or 
NGO authority, this process reproduces the depicted reality. What 
is described is created, both in terms of social and natural space.111
NGOs tend to have greater access to local knowledge than 
government agencies because their workers are embedded in the 
slum. However, they operate under similar administrative con-
straints as state administration and their tasks also require some 
simplification of the social. In order to report on their performance 
to funding sources, organizations create a standardized rubric for 
monitoring and evaluation, attempting to fit reality into a techno-
cratic framework. ICT allows for easier measurement and map 
creation. Funding applications or reports that do not use the ac-
cepted jargon of the development community will rarely receive 
funding.112 Hence there exists an external incentive to envision 
social reality in a way that corresponds to standardized technical 
language. For this reason, legibility is not just a problem of state-
craft but applies to other agents of authority as well. 
Ungoverned People
While legibility is required for formal authority to function 
and to pursue particular objectives, there is resistance to this pro-
cess. Few Kibera residents report having positive experiences with 
government, and political apathy in the slum is high. Residents I 
interviewed feel that registration, mapping, and ordering only lead 
to negative outcomes such as taxation from the state, electricity 
bills from a company, eviction from shelters, or forced movement 
to “something better,” rarely leading to social benefits.113 Slum 
clearance is one example of a initiative that has faced resistance 
from residents. Another example is a project undertaken by a rail-
way company that has attempted to register people living along the 
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tracks to maintain a security perimeter. !ese tracks form the main 
highway through Kibera, leading residents to resist registration 
and eventual eviction.
When studying ungoverned people, the power dynamics be-
tween center and periphery are better understood by viewing the 
marginalized as resisting state power, rather than viewing them as 
residents of an “underdeveloped” and ‘‘left behind” space that ought 
to be an object of development.114 From this perspective, the 
choice confronting Kibera residents in the face of projects designed 
to integrate a political community is how to position themselves 
strategically in relation to the state to ensure the greatest positive 
outcomes. !e incentive to do so is high in an urban slum, which 
on the one hand develops informal networks to provide for resi-
dents, but on the other is constantly reshaped by the exercise of 
formal authority. Mobile phone use represents passive resistance 
to authority as it enables residents to secure security and services 
through informal governance, in a form of strategic positioning. In 
this way, ICT influences how government actions are contested and 
challenged.
!ere are clear limitations to extending Scott’s analysis to 
Kibera that warrant attention. Kibera is deeply entwined with the 
political power center, with its history of interaction with the Ke-
nyan state, and thus cannot be considered ungoverned. Kibera resi-
dents depend on the outside world, on NGOs, on jobs in Nairobi, 
and on state institutions to protect their rights and services to some 
degree. Still, Kibera is located in a socially marginal area that is 
difficult to access and that is characterized by subsistence routines 
that maximize mobility and resistance to appropriation. Moreover, 
as in Scott’s analysis of the “Zomia” region in Southeast Asia,115 
the social structure in Kibera favors dispersion, with a high migra-
tion flux that obscures any obvious point of entry for administra-
tive projects. 
By providing their own services and security, while also chal-
lenging attempts to be integrated into formal governance struc-
tures, Kibera residents resist being made legible.
CONCLUSION
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!e advent of new ICT has created the possibility for change 
in Kenya. However, as hinted at by the different perspectives of 
George in Kibera and permanent secretary Ndemo in his office, 
views of what this possibility signifies differ considerably. To un-
derstand how new ICT influences governance and participatory 
politics, further research must explore how governance and author-
ity are contested by different actors, making clear whose participa-
tion is being analyzed, and to what end. Literature on ICT in a 
development context does not adequately explore such themes, 
as it tends to build on normative assumptions about the outcome 
of ICT use, overlooking the politics that determine who decides 
certain outcomes. !e field research included in this study reveals 
a more complex picture of this underlying dynamic than exists in 
much of the literature surrounding ICT in Kenya.
Kenya’s history of corrupt governance and ethno-regional di-
vision has propelled demands for good governance and participa-
tory democracy. As the ICT sector in Kenya has grown, the agen-
das supported by, respectively, the state and NGOs have merged 
with ICT4D. On the ground, these agendas play out in unexpected 
ways. On the one hand, formal governance uses ICT to integrate 
people into political processes and improve its governance record 
to legitimize authority. On the other hand, the Kibera community 
creates informal governance structures outside of formal control, 
resulting in communities that are more densely networked, but also 
marginalized from formal political life to a greater degree. 
Urban slums are neither chaotic sites that the language of 
formal governance makes them out to be, nor the underdeveloped 
spaces that are represented in development discourse. Rather, they 
represent a source of resistance to state and NGO attempts at 
integration. Such resistance circumvents the formal structures in 
subtle ways that are becoming more visible with the increased use 
of mobile phones, creating a localized understanding of the world 
that can be said to render the slum “invisible” to outsiders. !is cir-
cumvention effectively challenges the ability of the state to provide 
services that justify its authority, which in turn poses crucial chal-
242 +VEIWLSPQ1EOMRK7PYQW+SZIVREFPI
lenges for a state with a poor record of accountability and whose 
population experiences high levels of political apathy. While it ap-
pears like a potential solution to these problems, aggressively inte-
grating the polity is not necessarily the best course of action. When 
externally directed, integration may be met with greater resistance, 
especially when it is not accompanied by a corresponding extension 
of public services.
!e study of urban slums is becoming increasingly impor-
tant. UN-HABITAT reports that one billion people currently live 
in urban slums worldwide, a figure that is expected to double by 
2030.116 Understanding ICT and socio-political change in urban 
social space is vital to facing the challenges of population growth. 
Looking through the lenses of the relevant social actors helps un-
derstand how urban slums function and are manipulated. Formal 
governance attempts to make slums more legible through admin-
istrative simplification and by molding their social and natural en-
vironment. Participation in formal processes through ICT creates 
legibility and thus governability, with ICT serving as a political in-
strument. Yet as this paper illustrates, ICT is just as much a tool 
for exercising informal governance, a device for holding the state at 
arm’s length. 
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